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Fight and Win Without 




Sun Tzu, in his seminal book The Art of War, categorically states that “to 
fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme 
excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting”.1 
Here, the focus lies on undermining the morale of the opponent. In 
doing so, Sun Tzu specifically mentions that“[i]n all fighting, the direct 
method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be 
needed in order to secure victory” for “indirect tactics, efficiently applied, 
are inexhaustible […]”.2 This construct by Sun Tzu exemplifies the use 
of ‘deception’ in Chinese warfare. The key is: how to win without use of 
force?
On this view, Ren Li, in his book Lectures on Sun Zi’s Art of War, 
argues that “warfare is a way of deception” and is “the most shocking 
concept” given by Sun Tzu because “it favours an unchoreographed, 
asymmetric approach to fighting while rejecting any notion of constancy 
in warfare”.3 This particular perspective makes it imperative to understand 
how China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) interprets the concept of 
deception in warfare, given that it acts as the benchmark to understand 
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the PLA’s rationale for operations. Sun Tzu’s “ways of deception” find 
resonance in the Chinese perception of “how to fight a modern war” under 
the strategic guideline of “winning informationized local wars”. On the 
same lines, the 2015 White Paper on “China’s Military Strategy” notes 
that “the form of war is accelerating its evolution to informationization” 
which calls for China to build a national defence mobilisation system 
that can meet the requirements of “winning informationized wars and 
responding to both emergencies and wars”.4
What comprises the basis of such a strategic guideline? This new 
Chinese way of thinking can be attributed to the significant shift in the 
Chinese perceptions. That is to suggest that the thought process entails 
a three-fold perspective:5 first, an understanding that the “form of war” 
or conduct of warfare in a given period of time, has changed. Second, 
Preparation for Military Struggle (PMS) has constantly evolved with the 
changing “form of war” and the national security situation. Likewise, the 
basic point of PMS has been adjusted from being “winning local wars in 
conditions of modern technology, particularly high technology” in 1993 
to “winning local wars under conditions of informationization” in 2004 
and then to calls for “winning informationized local wars” in 2015. And 
third, the Chinese perception of the increasing security challenges has 
prompted a shift from having “fixed mindsets of mechanized warfare” 
to “establishing the ideological concept of information warfare”.6 In 
this framework of understanding, ‘hybrid warfare’ acts as a significant 
component of China’s way of fighting a modern war, as witnessed in its 
growing interest in waging an asymmetrical form of warfare in areas that 
constitute its ‘core interests’. Wherein, Sun Tzu’s recommendation of 
deception and intelligence, use of regular and irregular methods with an 
emphasis on defeating the enemy’s will to fight, act as key components of 
the current Chinese understanding of such warfare. The Chinese thinking 
to deal with a powerful adversary, as former Chinese Lieutanant General 
Li Jijun pointedly notes is:
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To cope with wars at the age of information, when guiding thinking, we 
should try hard to prevent direct conflicts with the enemy in the high-
technology field, and should create and select the most favorable timing, 
direction, form, and target to annihilate the enemy’s effective forces by 
combining conventional assaults with the ‘assassin’s mace’.7
China’s understanding of such warfare is similar to what is called 
‘hybrid warfare’. This assessment further exemplifies that the battlefield 
no longer remains limited to militaries, but has become an amalgamation 
of elements from society and the polity at large. With no definite rules or 
limits at play, hybrid warfare transcends the notion of the Clausewitzian 
sense of ‘traditional war’.
However, what is important to note is that such warfare is not a 
new concept for China. Historically, China has used such tactics towards 
its neighbours, as witnessed in the way Imperial China dealt with its 
“barbarian” neighbours, based on the “four methods approach”.8 Such 
an approach entailed: first, foreigners should be kept divided by “using 
barbarian to fight barbarians” by means of using “barbarian” mercenaries 
and strategic alliances to ensure division among China’s nomadic 
neighbours. The contemporary analogy to this would be using tactics 
such as diplomatic warfare; neutralising unfriendly states through public 
diplomacy; support for local insurgencies; and exercising pressure in 
international organisations such as using the veto in the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC). Second, if these failed, Imperial China would 
present bribes and tribute to foreign leaders in order to dissuade them 
from attacking China. The current equivalent of this would be China’s 
aid policy as seen in the case of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), New Silk Road Bank, and others. 
Third, in ancient/those times, China would build fortifications in order 
to deter external attacks. To which, the current correlation can be drawn 
in terms of China’s artificial island build-up in the South China Sea. And, 
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finally, if all else failed, military expeditions would be deployed.9 To which 
a link can be drawn in terms of China’s overseas military base in Djibouti 
for gaining access to the Indian Ocean Region. These are the areas which 
are increasingly becoming the new domains of Chinese warfare, the ‘grey 
zone’ where China conducts its hybrid warfare.
Owing to this perspective, the paper seeks to examine the Chinese 
understanding of hybrid warfare. In doing so, it will assess the components 
that define the Chinese way of fighting hybrid warfare in the 21st century.
The Chinese Conception of Winning by Fighting  
with Deception
Stating that “[a]ll warfare is based on deception”10, Sun Tzu posited that:
[W]hen able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we 
must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe 
we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near. 
[….] Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not 
expected.11
Owing to this perspective, China’s current military thinking is 
distinctively interpreted on the lines of deceiving the ‘other’. That is to 
suggest, given the PLA’s perception of the changing nature of warfare that 
cannot be fought with preconceived and predetermined strategies, Sun 
Tzu’s policy of ‘deception’ equated with ‘surprise’ is applied dynamically 
and provides the means to mislead the adversaries while employing 
agile and flexible responses to the actual conditions encountered on the 
battlefield. In this regard, in the Chinese understanding, ‘deception’ as 
Sun Tzu suggests, is practised in the following ways: first, the supremacy 
of unconventional warfare as opposed to the conventional; second, the 
value of ‘cheating’ as a traditional underpinning of deceptive warfare; 
third, the recognition that change keeps warfare in a constant state of 
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flux; finally, the imperative to focus on benefiting from, and controlling, 
one’s superiority in warfare.12 
If that is the case, then why the need for ‘deception’ as a strategy? 
In the Chinese viewpoint, as Ren Li argues, the goal of the “way 
of deception” is “to as much as possible increase our advantageous 
conditions and reduce the adversary’s advantageous conditions”.13 This 
suggests that deception not only involves manipulating an adversary’s 
understanding of one’s own capabilities and intentions, but also includes 
manipulating the situation with the goal of further degrading the 
adversary’s capabilities.14 In drawing a parallel, such a practice is noted 
in China’s policy towards securing its claims in the South China Sea. 
Wherein, earlier, Beijing utilised conventional operations such as military 
clashes with Vietnam (1974) and the Philippines (2012), it now uses 
unconventional ways such as constructing artificial islands as well as 
employing paramilitary operations by fishermen to secure its claims by 
exerting psychological pressure on its adversaries.15 
In doing so, this new form of warfare, based on deception and surprise, 
employs civilian technology as military weapons “without morality” and 
“with no limits”16—breaking the will of the adversary. China calls this 
new form of warfare “unrestricted warfare”. Given this amalgamated 
understanding of “hybrid warfare”, it becomes imperative to comprehend 
the Chinese way of fighting such warfare. Is it any different from the 
Western perspective? 
The term ‘unrestricted warfare’ entered the Chinese lexicon in 1999, 
when two Chinese Colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, published 
a book titled Unrestricted Warfare that claimed that the battlefield 
had changed fundamentally and was no longer limited to the militaries 
for fighting. What comprises such a non-traditional form of warfare, 
as the book notes, are elements such as financial warfare, smuggling 
warfare, cultural warfare, drug warfare, media and fabrication warfare, 
technological warfare, resources warfare, psychological warfare, network 
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warfare, international law warfare, environmental warfare and economic 
aid warfare.17 
Given this broad definition, a direct linkage can be drawn between the 
Chinese view of “unrestricted warfare” and the Western notion of “hybrid 
warfare” which, in the US perspective, is defined as the simultaneous and 
adaptive employment of “a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular 
tactics, terrorism and criminal behaviour in the battlespace to obtain 
their political objectives”.18 Michael Kofman and Mathew Rojasnsky of 
the Woodrow Wilson International Centre, based in Washington, have 
argued that the term “hybrid” denotes a combination of previously 
defined types of warfare, when an adversary, “employs some combination 
of previously defined types of warfare, whether conventional, irregular, 
political or information,” and that its “analytical utility is limited”.19 
This suggests that the Chinese “unrestricted warfare” is synonymous 
to the Western idea of “hybrid warfare”. The only difference lies in the 
conception of terminologies, however, the perception remains the same. 
This very difference makes it significant to understand the elements that 
comprise the Chinese idea of fighting hybrid warfare.
Elements of China’s Hybrid Warfare: San Zhong Zhanfa 
Strategy to Safeguard National Interest
Ideating on Sun Tzu’s dictum of “winning without waging a war”, in 
2003,20 the Communist Party’s Central Committee and Central Military 
Commission (CMC) put forward the concept of “Three Warfares” (san 
zhongzhanfa, 三战) as a set of codes for the PLA to conduct political 
warfare. Calling it the “Political Work Guidelines of the People’s Liberation 
Army”, Beijing’s three warfares strategy entailed : public opinion (media) 
warfare (yulunzhan, 舆论战), psychological warfare (xinlizhan, 心理
战), and legal warfare (faluzhan, 法律战). Wherein, the “three warfares 
strategy” mainly focusses on the following functions: control of public 
opinion (舆论控制); blunting an adversary’s determination (意志挫伤); 
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transformation of emotion (情感转化); psychological guidance (心智诱
导); collapse of (an adversary’s) organisation (组织瓦解); psychological 
defence (心理防御); and, restriction through law (法律制约).21 
While the three warfares are interrelated, each has a significant role 
to play. That is, first, public opinion or media warfare, which aims to 
shape public opinion, domestically as well as internationally. The means 
used are the materials delivered to public audiences through established 
news services, informal internet sites, and other social media to influence 
domestic and international perspectives associated with the ongoing 
disputes involving the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) interests.22 
In demanding absolute loyalty to the Party, Xi stated that the “[n]ation’s 
media outlets are essential to political stability” and that they need to 
“love the Party, protect the Party, and closely align themselves with 
the Party leadership in thought, politics and action” as “guiding public 
opinion is crucial to governance of the country”.23 This strategy of China 
was well-witnessed in case of the 2017 Doklam standoff, when China’s 
state-run media agencies were pressurising India to change its stance by 
emphasising on “lessons from the past” in reference to the 1962 War. 
Second, usage of psychological warfare, which aims at shaping the 
international image of China by influencing foreign decision-makers’ 
perceptions and their approach towards China. It is operated by means 
of pre-conflict posturing of military/paramilitary forces or application 
of other national capabilities (diplomatic, economic, and cultural) with 
the intention of intimidating adversaries and encouraging acquiescence 
to PRC-desired outcomes.24 In view of this, the five tasks associated with 
psychological warfare are: presenting one’s own side as just; emphasising 
on one’s own advantages; undermining the opposition’s will to resist; 
encouraging dissension in the enemy’s camp; and, implementing 
psychological defences.25
Third, legal warfare, which aims at offering legal justification 
for China’s assertive actions or policies. It is conducted by means of 
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exploitation of national and international legal systems. This is done 
by leveraging the existing legal regimes and processes to constrain the 
adversary’s behaviour, contest disadvantageous circumstances, confuse 
legal precedents, and maximise advantage in situations related to the 
PRC’s core interests.26 China’s use of such a strategy was witnessed in the 
case of the 2016 International Arbitral Tribunal on the South China Sea 
which gave its judgment against China and in favour of the Philippines.27 
In rejecting the verdict, China termed it as “null and void, and has no 
binding force. China neither accepts nor recognizes it” and that “China’s 
territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South 
China Sea shall under no circumstances be affected by those awards. 
China opposes, and will never accept, any claim or action based on 
those awards.” Furthermore, “China does not accept any means of third 
party dispute settlement or any solution imposed on China”.28 What is 
noteworthy is that China has been successful in shaping the international 
discourse in its favour given that the ‘ruling’ failed to impact China’s 
stance, and now, the Philippines under Rodrigo Duterte, is more inclined 
towards Beijing. Thus, it exemplifies China’s ‘win’ without fighting a war.
With the aim to break the opponent’s ‘will to fight’ without actual 
fighting, the three warfares emphasise on undertaking non-kinetic 
operations to influence the opponent’s behaviour. The three warfares 
concept represents the Chinese commitment to “expand potential areas 
of conflict from the purely ‘military’ (involving both direct and indirect 
force) to the ‘political’”,29 given that the doctrine is part of the PLA’s 
regulations for the conduct of “political work”.30 With this strategic 
guideline, China seeks to depart from fighting a conventional warfare 
in the battlefield to launching it in the political domain by means of 
manipulating the societal forces such as public opinion, legal systems 
and leadership aspects of the adversary. This makes political warfare a 
crucial part of the Chinese security strategy and foreign policy and helps 
formulate the Chinese discourse. With this, Beijing seeks to:
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... influence emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and behaviour of 
foreign governments, organisations, groups, and individuals in a manner 
favourable to one’s own political-military objectives.31
In view of this, such a non-kinetic form of warfare is not just limited 
to war-time but can be operated in peace-time as well, unlike traditional 
warfare. Furthermore, with China’s growing security challenges, which Xi 
Jinping defines as the “Three Trends” (三个前所未有, san ge qian suo wei 
you) and “Three Major Dangers” (三个危险, sangeweixian),32 the exercise 
of kinetic means is increasingly becoming a limited option. Here, the “Three 
Trends” exemplify the external environment, the international situation 
that is constantly changing and the new opportunities and challenges that 
are continually emerging, while the “Three Major Dangers” are those of 
China being “invaded, toppled and separated”.33 This is well-witnessed 
in the recent Hong Kong crisis that has got the Chinese leadership into 
a quandary, thus, adding to the long standing challenge from separatist 
forces like those of the “East Turkistan independence” in Xinjiang and 
the “Tibet independence” forces that have become a serious challenge to 
China’s internal security situation. In such cases, fighting the opponent 
through the ‘use of force’ is not a viable option for the Chinese leadership, 
as the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident has significantly curtailed its 
choice of enforcing domestic control.
What adds significantly to this security perception is the Chinese 
understanding of ‘national security’. According to Article 2 of the new 
national security law of the PRC passed on July 1, 2015, national security 
is defined as:
... the relative absence of international or domestic threats to the state’s 
power to govern, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, the welfare of 
the people, sustainable economic and social development, and other major 
national interests, and the ability to ensure a continued state of security.34
amrita jash
CLAWS Journal l Winter 2019 105
Furthermore, Article 3 draws a link between national security and 
economic, cultural and social security by stating that an overall national 
security perspective regards the “people’s security as the tenet, political 
security as the fundamental, economic security as the basis and military, 
cultural, and social security as the safeguard”.35 Given this perspective, 
China now defines national interest as including two major parts: 
national security and national development interest.36 The very aspect of 
‘national development interest’ further exemplifies the broadened scope 
of China’s national interest, wherein, anything that undermines China’s 
development can be perceived to be a threat.
This newly expanded understanding of national security reflects the 
shift in the way China perceives its threats, which unlike the past, are no 
larger limited to the physical border and have, instead, become more 
diversified, and as the very understanding of “absence of international 
or domestic threats” is mainly centred on safeguarding the legitimacy of 
the Communist Party of China (CPC). Even the PLA’s primary task lies 
in protecting China’s national interest, which, at the foremost, entails 
providing “strategic support for consolidating the leadership of the CPC 
and the socialist system”.37 This dictum of the PLA follows from Mao 
Zedong’s understanding that “the Chinese Red Army is an armed body 
for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution”.38 The PLA is the 
Party’s Army, tasked with maintaining the political power. Here, the 
objectives are two-fold: first, to ensure the continuation of the Party’s 
control; and, second, to prevent any form of external interference in 
China’s foreign and domestic affairs.
Owing to these underpinnings, China’s “three warfares” strategy, 
earlier handled by the General Political Department of the former 
General Staff Department, has become the responsibility of the Political 
Work Department (政治工作部), after the recent organisational reforms. 
The Political Work Department, which is subordinate to the CMC works 
in coordination with the PLA with the aim to create and safeguard the 
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legitimacy of the CPC’s political power from any international as well as 
domestic threat. In addition, the Party’s United Front Work Department 
(UFWD) also monitors and maintains checks and balances over ‘anti-
China’ narratives purported and perceived outside China that might seek 
to threaten the CPC’s control.
With such a strategy, the objective of the CPC’s political warfare has 
extended beyond the scope of Taiwan. Currently, under the guidance of 
“uniting with friends and disintegrating enemies,” the CPC’s political 
warfare strategy aims to promote the “rise of China within a new international 
order and defend against perceived threats to state security”.39 With such 
a ‘win without fight’ strategy, China is able to mould and influence the 
perception of others towards it, be it of friends or adversaries. Most 
importantly, with propaganda carried out both during peace-time and in 
armed conflict, China is able to maximise the outcome, given that it either 
“amplifies or attenuates the political effects of the military instrument of 
national power”.40 Given its non-traditional form of fighting an adversary, 
the Chinese strategy of the “three warfares” exemplifies the way China has 
mastered the art fighting ‘hybrid warfare’: ‘win without a fight’. 
Conclusion
China under Xi Jinping seeks to hone its combat skills; the hybrid domain 
remains not an exception as is the case with other major powers given that 
warfare is no longer fundamentally military in nature. Similarly, China’s 
idea of “winning informationized local wars” is also not just limited 
to the conventional domain but has increasingly come to characterise 
the unconventional areas where an adversary can be taken by ‘surprise’ 
without the ‘use of force’. This is well-witnessed in China’s justification of 
its actions to legitimise its claims with respect to Taiwan, the South China 
Sea, East China Sea, and others. 
Owing to this perspective, it remains indisputable that China’s “three 
warfares” strategy has become a definite feature of what China calls 
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unrestricted warfare. Such a way of waging war will only evolve with 
time, in tactics as well as magnitude. Likewise, with its growing impact, 
such a warfare strategy will also further expand the scope of Beijing’s 
strategic interests that, in all respects, seem to be expanding beyond 
China’s borders. In addition, this strategy also influences China’s policy 
of safeguarding its national interests not just abroad but also domestically 
in order to uphold the supremacy and legitimacy of the CPC. 
By applying the “three warfares” strategy in peace-time, China is able 
to shape the environment in a way that will facilitate the operations of the 
PLA in times of contingency. Thereby, China’s 21st century art of war 
comprises ‘unrestricted’ war that calls for ‘winning without even fighting 
the adversary’ and if fought, then to ‘fight and win’. 
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